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Political Institutions, Judicial Review,
and Private Property: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis
Daniel H. Cole*
Since Madison, jurists of all ideological stripes have more or
less casually presumed that constitutional judicial review is
absolutely necessary to protect private property rights against
over-regulation by political bodies. During the twentieth cen-
tury, this presumption led directly to the institution of regula-
tory takings doctrine.
Recently, the economist William Fischel and the legal
scholar Neil Komesar have raised important questions about,
respectively, the utility and the sufficiency of constitutional
judicial review for protecting private property. This article
supports their arguments with theoretical and historical evi-
dence that constitutional judicial review (1) is not strictly
necessary for protecting private property rights, and (2) may
have substantially less marginal social utility than most ju-
rists presume.
The theoretical evidence comes from positive political-
economic theories of property rights, according to which po-
litical institutions can be expected to substantially protect
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property rights in order to secure political and military sup-
port and generate tax revenues. The historical evidence comes
primarily from the United Kingdom, where property rights
have never been judicially protected against intentional and
uncompensated parliamentary expropriation or regulation,
but where Parliament has imposed substantial limits, includ-
ing compensation requirements, upon itself. Further evidence
comes from several American states that have enacted tak-
ings statutes.
The evidence presented in this article supports William
Fischel's normative conclusion that judicial review is more
important for protecting private property against the depre-
dations of local governments than state or federal govern-
ments. It also provides reason to believe that property rights
will be protected even if Neil Komesar is right that the courts
are institutionally incapable of doing so. Finally, the article
carries possible normative implications for regulatory takings
doctrine.
I. INTRODUCTION
To what extent is constitutional judicial review a necessary institu-
tion for protecting property rights? Nearly all American jurists, since
Madison, have thought the answer to this question both obvious
and incontestable: in the absence of judicial review, federal and state
governments would trample private property rights into dust. Re-
cently, however, two scholars-one an economist and the other a le-
gal scholar-have raised important challenges to the received wisdom
about property rights in the absence of constitutional judicial review.1
In his 1995 book Regulatory Takings,2 the economist William Fis-
chel argues that judicial review is not always necessary or desirable for
protecting private property rights because private property owners are
generally capable of protecting their interests in the political process,
particularly at higher (i.e., state and federal) levels of government. 3
Throughout this article, I use the phrase "constitutional judicial review" to de-
note the power of courts to (a) overturn statutes or (b) require governments to pay com-
pensation for legislative or regulatory impositions on private property rights. In the ab-
sence of "constitutional judicial review," courts may still possess the power to interpret
and enforce statutes and regulations.
2 William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics (Harvard,
1995).
3 Fischel believes that judicial review is more important for protecting property
rights against the regulatory activities of lower (e.g., municipal) levels of government,
where political processes are more likely to be influenced by majoritarian pressure. Id
at 180.
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The legal scholar Neil Komesar does not share Fischel's belief in the
ability of private property owners to protect their interests in political
processes; like most other legal scholars, he views judicial review as a
highly desirable institution for protecting property rights against gov-
ernment depredation. In stark contrast to other legal scholars, how-
ever, Komesar does not believe that the courts are up to the task. In his
2001 book Law's Limits,4 Komesar observes that the courts simply do
not possess the resources necessary to protect property rights from
unwarranted and uncompensated takings. Institutional design fea-
tures and supply-side constraints significantly limit the judiciary's
ability to deal with government interference with private property
rights. Consequently, Komesar is forced to conclude, "[elven if the
regulatory process is highly flawed (and it is), the severe problems in
... the adjudicative process may mean that the corrupt, excessive,
and repressive regulatory process is the best of bad alternatives."'
This article (1) adduces theoretical and historical support for Fis-
chel's claim that constitutional judicial review is not a strictly neces-
sary institution for protecting property rights, and (2) provides posi-
tive reasons to believe that even if courts are institutionally incapable
of fulfilling their constitutionally assigned role of protecting prop-
erty rights, as Komesar fears, democratic political institutions will
substantially protect property rights, even as they regulate them. The
evidence may not provide a sufficient basis for drawing firm nor-
mative conclusions about the "best" institutional structure for pro-
tecting property rights; but it does raise serious questions about in-
stitutional choice, which deserve more investigation than they have
received to date.
The article proceeds as follows. Section I reviews the tension be-
tween democracy and property rights as framed by Madison and more
recently by the likes of Holmes, Epstein, and Scalia. Section II intro-
duces Fischel's and Komesar's challenges to the conventional under-
standing of the "majoritarian difficulty" and its resolution through
judicially imposed limitations on exercises of eminent domain and
police power regulations. Section III provides theoretical and empiri-
cal support to Fischel's normative theory of regulatory takings. The
theoretical support comes from positive political-economy theories,
according to which political organizations can be expected to provide
and enforce private property rights in order to increase social produc-
tion, secure revenues (taxes) for the government, and garner political
and military support sufficient to ward off challengers. The empirical
' Neil K. Komesar, Law's Limits: The Rule of Law and the Supply and Demand of
Rights (Cambridge, 2001).
1 Id at 106.
144 Political Institutions, Judicial Review, and Private Property
support comes primarily from English constitutional and legal his-
tory. In the UK, the institution of constitutional judicial review has
never existed (and still does not exist after enactment of the 1998 Hu-
man Rights Act). Section IV, then, compares the UK's institutions for
takings and compensation with those of the US, and finds only mar-
ginal differences, suggesting that the UK's political system protects
property rights as well, or nearly as well, as the American judicial sys-
tem. Section V provides additional empirical support for the proposi-
tion that democratic political institutions protect private property
rights with evidence from several American states, including most re-
cently the adoption of Measure 37 in Oregon. Together, the evidence
from the US and UK (a) supports Fischel's theory that judicial review
is more important for protecting property rights against the deprada-
tions of local governments than state or federal governments, (b) pro-
vides reason to believe that private property rights will not perish
even if Komesar is right that the courts, for institutional reasons, can-
not adequately protect them, and (c) provides ample reason to repu-
diate the extreme form of distrust of democratic regulations repre-
sented by the judicial opinions of Justice Scalia and the scholarly
writings of Richard Epstein.
II. PROPERTY VERSUS DEMOCRACY: THE
"MAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY" FROM
MADISON TO SCALIA (VIA HOLMES
AND EPSTEIN)
Jurists since James Madison have presumed that an inherent tension
exists between democracy and property. Madison foresaw that prop-
erty owners would become, in the words of James Ely, a "vulnerable
minority"6 subject to majoritarian biases in legislative processes. To
prevent the majoritarian abuse of private property, Madison inserted
a "takings clause" into the Bill of Rights.7
6 James W Ely, Jr., The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of
Property Rights 54 (Oxford, 1998).
7 US Const. Amend. V. ( "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation"). It is worth noting that the takings clause was not added to the
Bill of Rights because of perceived abuses of property rights in the colonies by the
British Crown. As William Stoebuck has written, "while the British were scoundrels
in a thousand ways, they never abused eminent domain." William Stoebuck, A Gen-
eral Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 Wash. L Rev 553, 594 (1972). According to Richard
Epstein, the main motivation for the takings clause might have been colonial expro-
priations of food and supplies during times of war. Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 27 (Harvard, 1985). More practically, the
purpose may have been to minimize anti-federalist opposition to the fledgling consti-
tution. See Ely, The Guardian at 51-52 (cited in note 6).
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During the twentieth century the tension between property rights
and democracy that concerned Madison escalated with the emergence
of the welfare/regulatory state, which increasingly regulated private
property for the public, or some faction's, welfare. As property regu-
lation increased, so too did judicial suspicion that legislative bodies
were pressing private property rights into public service without just
compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment's takings clause.
Justice Holmes articulated this suspicion in the Supreme Court's
1922 Pennsylvania Coal ruling,' where he wrote that "a strong pub-
lic desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of
paying for the change. 9 Holmes believed that takings were a "natu-
ral" consequence of ever-increasing police power regulations-the
death by a thousand cuts of the takings clause (as well as the due pro-
cess and contract clauses 10 ) and private property itself. In Pennsylva-
nia Coal, he wrote that when the "seemingly absolute" protection of
private property "is found to be qualified by the police power, the nat-
ural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification more
and more until at last private property disappears."
To prevent this end, Holmes introduced into Supreme Court ju-
risprudence the doctrine of "regulatory takings." Without denying
the state's (or the federal government's) authority to regulate private
property, Holmes noted that if some police-power regulation "goes
too far" (in diminishing the value of private property), it will consti-
tute a compensable taking, as if the government had acted pursuant
to eminent domain."
By all accounts, Holmes's decision in Pennsylvania Coal had little
immediate impact either on the extent of government regulation or on
subsequent court decisions. 12 It certainly did not retard the advance
of the welfare/regulatory state, in which the Supreme Court gener-
ally acquiesced. The Court did not find another "regulatory taking"
for 70 years. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, how-
ever, conservative and libertarian scholars began calling for greater ju-
8 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon, 260 US 393 (1922).
9 Id at 416.
10 Id.
I I Id at 415. Holmes excepted regulations concerning traditional private nuisances.
12 See, for example., Fischel, Regulatory Takings at 24 (cited in note 2) ("Pennsyl-
vania Coal itself probably had no effect on coal mining or the subsidence problem").
Robert Brauneis, The Foundation of Our "Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence": The
Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon,
106 Yale L J 613, 665 (1996) ("after being cited in a moderate number of Supreme Court
opinions between 1922 and 1935, Mahon all but disappeared from the United States
Reports for over two decades. In the twenty-two years from 1936 through 1957, Mahon
appeared in a single obscure dissent by Justice Frankfurter.").
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dicial intervention to limit the ability of democratic institutions to
regulate private property rights.
Among the more vociferous libertarian critics of the welfare/regu-
latory state is Richard Epstein. In his influential 1985 book, Takings:
Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 13 Epstein argues
that the government's power to regulate private property without com-
pensation is no more extensive than the common-law rights of private
actors to control nuisances and prevent trespasses. 14 Consequently,
most government regulations of private property constitute compen-
sable takings.
Epstein claims his theory of takings is rooted in "Lockean prin-
ciples.' 5 This claim is dubious. According to Locke, individuals ac-
quire property rights by virtue of labor or first possession. Once ac-
quired, those rights cannot be extinguished or altered without consent
of the owner. 16 So far, this is perfectly consistent with Epstein's the-
ory of takings. However, Locke defines "consent" broadly in Of Civil
Government [1690] to include "consent of the majority, giving it
either by themselves, or their representatives chosen by them. .. .,1
In his Critical Notes on Stillingfleet [ 1681], Locke more explicitly
recognizes the principle of tacit consent, writing, "what is done in
parliament in civil things may be truly said to be the consent of the
nation because they are done by their representatives who are em-
powered to that purpose."'8 Thus, representative governments pos-
sess the tacit consent of the governed, including property owners, to
tax and regulate private property in the public interest. On this point,
Epstein turns against Locke, claiming that the former's theory of
tacit consent is "defective" and "in powerful tension with the theory
of representative government."'19
Epstein must oppose Locke on the issue of tacit consent because,
if representative government possesses the consent (tacit or other-
wise) of private property owners to regulate their properties, then no
legitimate basis exists for judicial review of political restrictions on
private property rights. Plainly, Locke did not believe, as Epstein does,
that representative governments possess no greater authority than
13 Epstein, Takings (cited in note 7).
14 Id at 36, 121, 266, and 281.
1- Id at 36.
16 John Locke, Of Civil Government 138; Epstein, Takings at 10-16 (cited in
note 7).
'
7John Locke, Of Civil Government 140, 142 (1690). $ 142. Locke's notion of tacit
consent provides the basis for the presumption of parliamentary infallability. See note
63 and accompanying text.
is John Locke, Political Essays 373, Mark Goldie, ed (Cambridge, 1997).
19 Epstein, Takings at 14 (cited in note 7).
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private neighbors to restrict private property. Nor did Locke believe,
as Epstein does, that judicial review of legislation was the appropri-
ate solution to legislative depredations of individual rights.2 0 Rather,
the appropriate solution, according to Locke, was for the public to re-
move or replace the legislators:
there can be but one supreme power, which is the legislative, to
which all the rest are and must be subordinate, yet the legisla-
tive being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there re-
mains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the
legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the
trust reposed in them: for all power given with trust for the at-
taining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that end is
manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be
forfeited, and the power devolve into the hands of those that
gave it, who may place it anew where they shall think best for
their safety and security. And thus the community perpetually
retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts
and designs of any body, even of their legislators, whenever they
shall be so foolish, or so wicked, as to lay and carry on designs
against the liberties and properties of the subject .... 21
The most one can say about the relation between Epstein's theory of
takings and Locke's theory of property is that the former is rooted in
some Lockean principles, but is in "powerful tension" with others.
At its base, Epstein's theory of takings is motivated by a distrust of
democratic government that Locke did not share. According to Ep-
stein, "[t]he argument for judicial activism rests on the perception
that flaws in the democratic process lead to the deprivation of indi-
vidual rights, including those of property... Emphasis upon the im-
perfections of government leads to strict scrutiny and more extensive
judicial action. 2 2
When Epstein writes about government "imperfections," he is not
referring to Madison's "majoritarian difficulty" of democratic majori-
20 See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy
151 (Oxford, 1999).
21 John Locke, Of Civil Government at T 149.
22 Epstein, Takings at 30 (cited in note 7). As both Ronald Coase, Discussion: The
Regulated Industries, 54 Amer Econ Rev 194-95 (1964), and Neil Komesar, Law's Lim-
its at 23-6 (cited in note 4), have pointed out, the imperfections of any one body (such
as a legislature) always make another body (such as the judiciary) appear superior. The
problem is that all organizations and institutions, including governments, courts, and
markets, are imperfect. Consequently, the imperfections of one cannot automatically
justify a preference for another. Comparative institutional analysis is required to de-
termine the institutional/organizational choice that, in the circumstances, fails least.
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ties imposing their will on a vulnerable minority of property owners.
Rather, Epstein's primary concern is with minority factions that assert
disproportionate influence over democratic processes. He asserts, for
example, that "the takings clause is designed to control rent seeking
and political faction.'2 3 As we shall see in the next section,24 Kome-
sar argues that this is a fatal flaw in Epstein's theory of takings be-
cause just compensation is neither an efficient nor an equitable rem-
edy for problems of minoritarian bias in legislative decisionmaking.
In the last fifteen years of the twentieth century, Epstein's approach
to takings gained many adherents among scholars and judges, includ-
ing Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. 25 In his opinion in the 1992
case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,26 Justice Scalia res-
urrected Holmes's regulatory takings doctrine. In so doing, Justice
Scalia opined that legislatures would always seek to avoid paying com-
pensation for eminent domain takings by casting their actions in
police-power terms: "Since... a [police power] justification can be for-
mulated in practically every case, this amounts to a test of whether
the legislature has a stupid staff.' 27 Simply put, political institutions
cannot be trusted to respect and protect private property rights.
Much has been written over the years about Holmes's opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal, Epstein's theory of takings, and Scalia's opinion in
Lucas, but hardly anyone has questioned the underlying premise that
constitutional judicial review is essential to protect private property
owners from uncompensated takings. Even reputedly "Liberal" judges,
such as William Brennan, have assumed that in the absence of the in-
stitution of judicial review, democratic bodies would trample on pri-
vate property rights.2
Recently, however, two scholars, writing from very different per-
spectives, have raised questions about, respectively, the need and the
utility of judicial review for protecting property rights against demo-
cratic regulation.
23 Epstein, Takings at 281 (cited in note 7).
24 See notes 41-2 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., Douglas T Kendell and Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical
Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B C Envtl Aff L Rev 509 (1998) (sug-
gesting that Epstein's theory of takings is the basis of a intensive effort by conservative
Republicans to alter the size and structure of government); Benjamin Allee, Drawing
the Line in Regulatory Takings Law: How a Benefits Fraction Supports the Fee Simple
Approach to the Denominator Problem, 70 Fordham L Rev 1957, 1993 (2002) (claim-
ing that Justice Scalia has been influenced by Epstein's theory of the denominator prob-
lem in regulatory takings law).
2 Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003 (1992).
27 Id at 1025 n. 12.
See San Diego Gas & Electric Co v City of San Diego et al, 450 US 621, 636-661
(1981) (Brennan, J, dissenting).
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III. QUESTIONING THE MADISONIAN
TRADITION: FISCHEL ON THE VIRTUES
OF DEMOCRACY AND KOMESAR ON
THE COMPARATIVE FUTILITY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW
As noted in the Introduction, William Fischel believes that private
property owners generally are capable of protecting their interests in
the political process; they are not a "discrete and insular minority" 29
likely to be harmed by majoritarian excesses. In his view, "economic
interest groups would be able to form alliances to protect themselves
from short-sighted populism. '30 This claim is consistent with eco-
nomic theories of collective action according to which discrete groups
can coalesce around an issue of great importance to the group, and ex-
ert disproportionate influence on the political process, compared to
larger, more diffuse groups, including the "general public.' 3 1 More con-
tentiously, Fischel asserts that "[vioters and representatives in large
jurisdictions also are more likely to be concerned with their reputa-
tion for fair dealings, since bad reputations are apt to harm future gen-
erations. '32 This amounts to a claim that governments in larger juris-
dictions are inherently more trustworthy with private property rights
than governments in smaller jurisdictions. Thus, Fischel repudiates
the general judicial distrust of legislatures, and the police power, that
motivated Justice Holmes's opinion in Pennsylvania Coal, Richard
Epstein's theory of takings, and Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas.
Fischel concludes that in many circumstances, especially in larger
jurisdictions, "political action, which is often disparaged as rent-
seeking, is sufficient to protect property without the help of judges' 33
He supports this conclusion by noting that the United States ranks
near the top of international comparisons of security of property rights,
despite the rise of the welfare/regulatory state, with its increasing lim-
itations on land uses, and limited judicial review of government eco-
nomic regulation since the decline of the Lochner era.3 4 Even if that
were not the case, Fischel doubts the ability of judges to do a better
(that is, more efficient and effective) job than the political process. 35
29 United States v Carolene Products Co, 304 US 144, 153 n. 4 (1938). See also John
Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard, 1980).
30 Fischel, Regulatory Takings at 180 (cited in note 2).
31 See generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and
the Theory of Groups (Harvard, 1971).
32 Fischel, Regulatory Takings at 80 (cited in note 2).
Id at 324.
34 Id at 140. For more on international rankings for protection of property rights see
notes 125-128 and accompanying text.
35 Id at 317.
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Neil Komesar does not share Fischel's faith in political processes, but
he concurs in Fischel's doubts about the judiciary's capacity to effi-
ciently and effectively protect property rights. As noted in the Intro-
duction, Komesar refers to democratic regulatory "institutions" as
"highly flawed...... corrupt, excessive, and repressive.' 36 They suffer
from twin "political malfunctions" of majoritarian bias (the tyranny
of the majority) and minoritarian bias (disproportionate influence by
discrete interest groups, who do not represent the "public interest").
Uncompensated takings of private property can occur as a conse-
quence of either majoritarian or minoritarian malfunctions. But this
fact alone cannot support the conclusion that judicial review is a nec-
essary institution for protecting property rights. Komesar rightly
notes that the flaws inherent to one institutional and organizational
set (politics + legislatures) cannot be used to justify the selection of an-
other set (law + courts), which may suffer from equal or worse flaws.
Comparative institutional analysis is needed to weigh the respective
costs and benefits of outcomes under alternative institutional and or-
ganizational solutions, each of which is flawed to some extent. 37
When it comes to protecting private property rights, Komesar be-
lieves that the judicial system may be even more flawed than the po-
litical process. 38 It is not that the courts are unwilling to protect prop-
erty rights, but they suffer from various institutional deficiencies, two
of which are particularly disabling. First, Komesar believes that fully
protecting property rights would outstrip judicial resources; that is, the
supply of judicial compensation remedies could not possibly keep pace
with the demand for them. 39 Second, the remedy for takings of private
property-just compensation-corrects majoritarian bias (internal-
izing the costs to the beneficiaries of the government regulation), but
not minoritarian bias.40 To the extent takings occur because of the
latter political malfunction, the judicial remedy would not correct
the problem-or, more accurately, it would fix the wrong problem.
If a taking occurs because of legislation or regulations that benefit
not the general public (the majority) but a certain interest group, re-
quiring the government and, through it, the general public (the tax-
payers) to pay compensation would only compound the injustice.
This point, Komesar notes,4' is where Richard Epstein's theory of tak-
36 See note 5 and accompanying text.
3' Komesar, Law's Limits at 23-26 (cited in note 4). Also see generally Neil K. Kome-
sar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Pol-
icy (U Chicago, 1994).
38 Komesar, Law's Limits at 84-85 (cited in note 4).
39 Id at 3-4, 26, 35-6, 163.
40 Id at 94-7.
41 Id at 94-5.
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ings goes seriously awry. As noted in the preceding section, Epstein
argues that most government regulations constitute compensable
takings, and that these takings result primarily from minoritarian
malfunctions (rent-seeking).42 However, the remedy of just compen-
sation, as Komesar points out, simply is not appropriate for correct-
ing minoritarian malfunctions.
Komesar concludes that the political system may actually provide
greater protection for property rights than the judicial system could
possibly provide. He goes so far as to assert that the political/regula-
tory process may be the "best friend" private property owners have.43
IV. POLITICAL PROTECTION OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC THEORY
AND EVIDENCE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM
Neil Komesar's conclusion poses a puzzle. How can government be,
at once, "the best friend" and the greatest threat to private property?
From Epstein's perspective, at least, relying on legislative bodies to
protect property rights would be like relying on foxes to guard hen
houses. But positive reasons exist, in addition to Komesar's negative
reason of the futility of judicial review, for expecting democratic bod-
ies to respect and protect property rights. Those reasons have their
basis in political-economic theory; and that theory receives substan-
tial empirical support from the history of property regulation and
compensation in the United Kingdom and several American states.
A. The Theoretical Basis for Political Protection of Private Property
The following seven propositions of positive political-economic the-
ory suggest that political institutions would protect property rights
to some (albeit uncertain) extent, even in the absence of judicial re-
view: (1) all governments, even dictatorships, require substantial po-
litical and military support as well as revenue to survive (assuming
viable competitors);44 (2) the government's political/military support
and revenue, as well as the overall level of economic growth in soci-
42 Epstein, Takings at 281 (cited in note 7); see also note 24 and accompanying text.
13 Komesar, Law's Limits at 106 (cited in note 4). For a more detailed review of
Komesar's thesis, and its bearing on Fischel's approach to takings law, see Daniel H.
Cole, Taking Coase Seriously: Neil Komesar on Law's Limits, 29 L & Soc Inquiry 261
(2004).
44 See Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History 22 (W W Nor-
ton, 1981); Christopher Clague, et al., Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and
Democracies, 1 J Econ Growth 243 (1996) (finding that property and contract rights are
significantly associated with a proxy for the time horizons for autocrats (the log of
years in power), and, in democracies, with the duration of democratic government.).
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ety, depend critically on the structure of institutions; 4 (3) secure prop-
erty rights are an important component of the state's institutional
structure because they provide a necessary basis for capitalization
and economic exchange, which lead to economic growth and provide
revenues (through taxation) to the government;46 (4) property rights
are costly to design and enforce41 (5) governments generally are able
to define and enforce property rights at lower cost than could volun-
tary groups, especially in expanding markets; 48 (6) even on the most
parsimonious theory of the state, completely self-interested, rent-
seeking governments can be expected to establish and enforce prop-
erty rights to the extent that the governors believe private property
rights will increase their political and military support and their rev-
enues, thereby increasing their prospects for survival; 9 (7) the struc-
4s Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A
New Economic History 91 (Cambridge, 1973); Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael LaPorta, Flo-
rencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, Do Institutions Cause Growth?, NBER
Working Paper Series, Working Paper 10568 (June 2004).
See Glaeser, Do Institutions Cause Growth?at 5 (cited in note 45). Also see gen-
erally Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the
West and Fails Everywhere Else (Basic, 2000); Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, Insti-
tutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institu-
tional Measures, 7 Econ & Politics 207 (1995)(finding that institutions that protect
property rights are crucial for economic growth and rates of investment as a share of
gross domestic product.).
17 See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960);
also see Carl Dahlman, The Open-Field System and Beyond: Property Rights Analysis
of an Economic Institution 83 (Cambridge, 1980) (nothing that property rights are ex-
pensive-sometimes too expensive-to define); Terry L. Anderson and Donald J Leal,
Free Market Environmentalism 167 (Palgrave, 1991) ("Property rights are costly to de-
fine and enforce.").
41 North and Thomas, The Rise of the Western World at 7 (cited in note 45). Thus,
"[jfustice and the enforcement of property rights are simply another example of a
public good publicly funded." Id.49 Itai Sened, The Political Institution of Private Property 81 (Cambridge, 1997). See
also North and Thomas, The Rise of the Western World at 6 (cited in note 45) ("we pay
government to establish and enforce property rights"); North, Structure and Change
at 33-34 (cited in note 44) ("The state ... will encourage and specify efficient property
rights only to the extent that they are consistent with the wealth-maximizing objec-
tives of those who run the state"); WL. Grnat and J. Munro, eds, VI Acts of the Privy
Council of England: Colonial Series 591 (1908-12), quoted in P.J Marshall, Parliament
and Property Rights, in J. Brewer and S. Staves, eds, Early Modern Conceptions of Prop-
erty 530, 532-33 (Routledge, 1996) ("'Experience shows that the possession of property
is the best security for a due obedience and submission to government."'); Clague, et
al., 1 J Econ Growth 243 (cited in note 44) (finding a strong correlation between prop-
erty and contract rights and an autocrat's time in power).
Even regimes that are anti-democratic and/or ideologically opposed to private prop-
erty rights must establish and protect property rights for certain elite groups, such as
military officers and financiers, without whose support the regimes would fall. See, for
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ture of property rights may or may not maximize either social welfare
(efficiency) or social justice (equity).0
The political-economic propositions listed above-especially prop-
osition (6)-suggest that no contradiction exists between the as-
sumption that governments operate strategically to further their own
interests and the prediction that those same governments will sub-
stantially protect private property rights.5' The puzzle is solved! Gov-
ernment really can be the "best friend" private property owners have,
as Neil Komesar suggests, 2 while constituting at the same time a
threat to private property rights through expropriation and regula-
tion. According to the political economist Itai Sened, "[t]he key to the
solution of this puzzle is to realize the fact that governments' in-
volvement in the grant and enforcement of rights reflects their de-
pendence on the support of their citizens. Most of the benefits that
government officials obtain are extracted from the citizens. Govern-
ments depend on popular support and tax revenues to remain in
power. Their sensitivity to the interests of the common citizen is thus
example, Christoph Buchheim and Jonas Schemer, The Role of Private Property in the
Nazi Economy: The Case of Industry (unpublished typescript on file with the author
and available on the World Wide Web at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/cromer/
e2l Fj04/buchheim.pdf). More to the point, regimes that do not sufficiently protect
private property tend not to survive very long. The USSR, for example, survived less
than a century. Nominally "Communist" China appears to have learned this lesson,
as it has moved increasingly in recent years toward a market economy based on private
property. See, for example, Tom Bethell, The Noblest Triumph: Property and Prosper-
ity Through the Ages Ch. 21 (St. Martin's, 1998). However, private land "ownership" in
China remains far less extensive, and is much less well protected, than in countries
such as the United States and the United Kingdom. See, for example, Katherine Wil-
helm, Rethinking Property Rights in Urban China, 9 UCLA J Intl L & Foreign Aff 227,
248-49 (2004) (nothing that private property rights in Chinese cities are limited both in
time and in scope, and are always insecure).
50 See North, Structure and Change at 22 (cited in note 44) ("Property rights that
produce sustained economic growth have seldom held sway throughout history..
and at 28 n. 12 ("'inefficient' property rights are the rule, not the exception"); North
and Thomas, The Rise of the Western World at 7 (cited in note 45) ("there is no guar-
antee that the government will find it to be in its interest to protect those property
rights which encourage efficiency (i.e., raise the private rates of return on economic ac-
tivities towards the social rate) as against those in which the property rights protected
may thwart growth altogether.... [A] prince may find short-run advantage in selling
exclusive monopoly rights which may thwart innovation and factor mobility (and,
therefore, growth) because he can obtain more revenue immediately from such a sale
than from any other source...); Sened, Political Institution at 101 (cited in note 49)
("One reason why governments fail to seize opportunities to enrich society and them-
selves by creating property rights, and why they often grant property rights that only
impoverish society, is that they do not have complete information.").
s' See id at 5.
52 See note 43 and accompanying text.
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crucial for their own survival and prosperity"5 3 To the extent that the
"interests of the common citizen" include private property, it follows
that sensitivity to the property rights of the common citizen is cru-
cial to a government's political survival and prosperity.
However, as proposition (7) suggests, the political institution and
protection of private property may be neither efficient nor equitable.
It is entirely possible, even probable, that governments, particularly
in non-democratic countries, might protect some property rights (or
the rights of some owners) more than others. This could warrant the
institution of constitutional (judicial) protections in order to enhance
efficiency, equity, or both.
B. Takings and Compensation in Practice in the UK
The United Kingdom provides several hundred years' worth of histor-
ical evidence in support of the theory that political institutions sub-
stantially protect private property rights, even in the absence of con-
stitutional requirements of just compensation and judicial review of
legislation. As in the US, Parliament virtually always provides com-
pensation when it takes title to private property, but it only rarely
compensates for regulatory impositions on private property rights.
1. The "Convention" of Compensation for Expropriation (Taking
Title) in the UK
In the UK, as in the US, governments have "followed the practice of
expropriating land for certain purposes for several centuries. ' s4 But
there is an important difference. When a government expropriates
title to land in the US, it must pay "just compensation" according to
the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. In the
United Kingdom, however, there is no constitutional right of com-
pensation for governmental takings. The courts do not possess the
authority to require Parliament to pay; nor do they determine what
constitutes adequate compensation.5 5 Nevertheless, Parliament vir-
tually always pays compensation when it takes title to private prop-
erty. For centuries, compensation for takings has been a convention
of parliamentary practice.
53 Sened, Political Institution at 5 (cited in note 49).
54 Stoebuck, 47 Wash L Rev at 561 (cited in note 7).
-1 Beverly J Pooley, The Evolution of British Planning Legislation 17 (William Hein,
1982) ("There is ... no constitutional requirement in Britain that compensation
should be paid, and the amount of compensation has always been a matter of execu-
tive, and not judicial, determination.").
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The distinction between constitutional law and convention is
fundamental:
The 'unwritten' British constitution includes a great many stat-
utes, but any British statute can be repealed by another. The pass-
ing and repeal of Acts of Parliament is ultimately a question of
political power, exercised (subject ultimately to revolution, as in
1689) in accordance not only with existing statutes but also with
constitutional conventions. These are not law (which is why they
are called 'conventions') but are tacitly observed in constitutional
practice in order to avoid anarchy or revolution, the system in ef-
fect being one of self-regulation. One of the conventions is that
the courts do not enforce or change these conventions. They are
instead enforced by political observance and changed by imper-
ceptible evolution except when a relevant statute is passed.5 6
In the UK, government authority to expropriate land or impress it
into public service stems from two distinct sources: the Crown's pre-
rogative powers-specifically, the power of "purveyance" (to impress
private property into public service) and Parliament's supreme and
plenary authority to govern the country. Under the Crown's preroga-
tive power:
the king or his ministers might make use of private land and
to some extent even destroy the substance of it, all without
compensation. For instance, the king might ... dig in private
land for saltpeter to make gunpowder for defense of the realm.
Or he might, through his commissioners of sewers, rebuild
and repair ancient drains, ditches, and streams for draining the
land to the sea. This came from his power to guard against the
sea and to regulate navigation. From this same power, he might
build and repair lighthouses, build dikes, and grant port fran-
chises. To carry out his prerogative to coin money, he had power
to work all gold and silver mines. Fortifications could be built
without compensation on private land, these being, of course,
for defense of the realm. Also without compensating, the king's
officers could raze private buildings and protect his subjects
against a conflagration.5 7
One prerogative power the Crown never possessed, even before the
Glorious Revolution of 1688-89, was the authority to take legal title
16 Professor K Davies, Eminent Domain and the Jury, 150 New L J 1079 (2000). See
also EW Maitland, The Constitutional History of England 342, H.L.A. Fisher, ed
(1908).
57 Stoebuck, 47 Wash L Rev at 563 (cited in note 7).
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to private land.5 8 This power resides in Parliament alone.5 9 As the
"supreme" or "sovereign" governmental authority in the United King-
dor, 60 Parliament exercises plenary authority over the country. It is
"omnicompetent and might legislate over any matter that might come
before it."' 61 Moreover, Parliamentary acts are presumed to represent
the will of the entire nation because "everie Englishman is entended
to bee there [in Parliament] present ... and the consent of Parliament
is taken to be eevrie mans consent."62
This presumption of universal consent gives rise to the doctrine of
Parliamentary infallibility- which disables the courts from voiding
Parliamentary acts (although judges retain the authority to interpret
and enforce statutes).64 As Chief Justice Cockburn and Justice Black-
burn wrote in the 1872 case of Exparte Canon Selwyn, "There is no
judicial body in the country by which the validity of an act of parlia-
ment can be questioned. An act of the legislature is superior in au-
thority to any court of law ... and no court could pronounce a judg-
ment as to the validity of an act of parliament.' 65 Nor does the Crown,
5' See Case of the Isle of Ely, 10 Coke, 141, 77 Eng Rep 1139 (1610) (holding that the
king could not, but Parliament could, empower sewer commissioners to expropriate
privately owned lands needed for new drainage works). Also see Stoebuck, 47 Wash L
Rev at 564 (cited in note 7); Davies, 150 New J J 1079 (cited in note 56).
s9 See William Blackstone, I Commentaries on the Laws of England 140 (1979
[1765]1.
60 Pooley, Evolution at 31 (cited in note 55) (referring to Parliament as "supreme");
Malcolm Grant, Urban Planning Law 19 (Sweet & Maxwell, 1982) (referring to "the
sovereignty of Parliament"). For an excellent review of the history and theory of par-
liamentary sovereignty, See Goldsworthy, Sovereignty of Parliament (cited in note 20).
61 Matthew P. Harrington, "Public Use" and the Original Understanding of the So-
Called "Takings" Clause, 53 Hastings L J 1245, 1266 (2002).
62 Sir Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum 49, L Alston, ed (1906 [1583]), quoted
in Harrington, 53 Hastings L J at 1265 (cited in note 61).
63 Id. Also see Sir John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Anglie 41, S.B. Chrimes, ed
& trans, (1949) (noting that Parliamentary enactments have "the assent of the whole
realm, so they cannot be injurious to the people nor fail to secure their advantage.").
Fortescue (c. 1395-1477) served as Lord Chancellor and as a Chief Justice of England.
Note the consistency of Smith's and Fortescue's statements with John Locke's later
theory of "tacit consent," discussed notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
6' See Davies, 150 New L J 1079 (cited in note 56); Harrington, 53 Hastings L J at
1266 (cited in note 61); Pooley, Evolution at 33 (cited in note 55) ('All that a court can
do with an act of Parliament is to see that it has been validly passed and then to inter-
pret and apply it .... [If an individual is aggrieved by a ministerial act, provided that
the Minister has acted within the powers given to him by Parliament, the individual
has no means of attack other than the political.").
6 5 Exparte Canon Selwyn, 36 JP. 54 (1872), quoted in Goldsworthy, Sovereignty of
Parliament at 227 (cited in note 20). Also see Belfast Corporation v OD Cars Ltd, (1960]
NI 60 (14 Dec. 1959) ("Matters of policy which are determined by the Government and
carried out in detail by the aid of an experienced administrative staff cannot be confided
to the judiciary."). In a 1994 lecture, Lord Bingham, who was appointed Lord Chief Jus-
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by convention, intervene to veto or even voice concerns about legis-
lation.66 Consequently, as Blackstone wrote, "[slo long.., as the En-
glish constitution lasts, we may venture to affirm, that the power
of parliament is absolute and without control.'' 67 The only real con-
straint on Parliament's plenary authority is self-regulation in view of
possible electoral replacement, revolution, or anarchy 68
Parliament's authority to take or regulate private property, with or
without compensation, is no more limited than its authority to leg-
islate on any other matter of concern. On the presumption that Par-
liament represents the interests of all the UK's citizens, its decision
to either tax or take property from any subject has the implicit legal
consent of the entire realm, including those from whom property is
taken.69 Parliament, thus, "'has an absolute power as to the posses-
tice in 1996 noted that: "If Parliament were clearly and unambiguously to enact, how-
ever improbably, that a defendant convicted of a prescribed crime should suffer muti-
lation, or branding, or exposure in a public pillory, there could be very little a judge
could do about it-except resign." Tom Binham, "Anglo-American Reflections," First
Pilgrim Fathers' Lecture, Plymouth Law Society, 29 Oct. 1994, reprinted inTom Bing-
ham, The Business of Judging: Selected Essays and Speeches 239 (2000), and quoted in
Robert Stevens, The English Judges: Their Role in the Changing Constitution 66 (2005).
66 See Davies, 150 New L J 1079 (cited in note 56).
67 Blackstone, Commentaries at 157 (cited in note 59). This is not entirely accu-
rately As Maitland has explained, Maitland, Constitutional History at 387 (cited in
note 56), Parliament does not have the power to bind future Parliaments. In other
words, one Parliament cannot enact a law that cannot be repealed by another.
68 See A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 76-7, 79
(Liberty Fund 10th ed, 1964); Davies, 150 New L J 1079 (cited in note 56); Pooley, Evo-
lution at 31 (cited in note 55) (noting that, even though Parliament is "supreme"
"there are many conventions which the government must observe, and a violation of
these conventions would result at best in political annihilation of the offending gov-
ernment at the next election and at worst in revolution."). But see Harry (Lord) Wolfe,
Droit Public-English Style, Pub. L. 57-8 (1995) ("ultimately there are even limits on
the supremacy of Parliament which it is the courts' inalienable responsibility to iden-
tify and uphold. They are limits of the most modest dimensions which I believe any
democrat would accept .... IT~he courts are the final arbiters as to the interpretation
and application of the law. As both Parliament and the courts derive their authority
from the rule of law so both are subject to it and cannot act in [a] manner which in-
volves its repudiation...").
69 Harrington, 53 Hastings L J at 1265 (cited in note 61). Also see S.R. Gardiner, The
Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 114 (Clarendon 3d ed, 1906)
(Parliament was thought "fittest for the preservation of that fundamental propriety
which the subject has in his lands and goods, because each subject's vote is included in
whatsoever is there done."). Note, once again, how the presumption of consent satis-
fies, in theory, John Locke's condition that "The Supream Power cannot take from any
Man any part of his Property without his own consent." Locke, Of Civil Government
at $ 138 (cited in note 21). See also notes 17-21 and accompanying text; Goldsworthy,
Sovereignty of Parliament at 69 (cited in note 20) ("The fiction that the consent of Par-
liament was tantamount to the consent of every subject meant that property rights
could be transferred or altered by the King in Parliament, but not by the King alone!').
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sion of all temporal things within this realm, in whose hands soever
they be ... to take them from one man, and give them to another
without any cause of consideration, that it binds the law of con-
science."''70 As Philip Nichols has written, "if an injury to property is
expressly authorized by act of Parliament, the courts of justice can
give no redress, no matter how grossly the provisions of the Magna
Carta have been violated."I'
Given Parliament's plenary authority over property rights and com-
pensation for takings, "the use of eminent domain was limited only
by those restraints the legislature imposed on itself. '72 In other words,
Parliament is deemed trustworthy as a matter of law with private
property rights.
As early as the fifteenth century, Parliament enacted laws author-
izing the expropriation of land. A 1427 statute, for example, allowed
the commissioners of sewers to take land for locating new sewers,
ditches, gutters, walls, bridges, and causeways for draining the lowlands
in Lincoln County73 This statute did not explicitly require compen-
sation for any land taken for these purposes, perhaps because such
takings were in furtherance of the king's prerogative powers relating
to navigation. By the early sixteenth century, however, it had become
conventional (though never constitutionally required) for Parliament
to pay compensation for expropriating private property.74 This con-
vention evolved from statutes expressly requiring compensation. A
1514 statute, for example, authorized the City of Canterbury to im-
prove a river, but expressly required the City to compensate anyone
70 Christopher St. German, A Treatise Concerning the Division Between Spiritual-
ity and Temporality, in J.B. Trapp, ed, The Complete Works of St. Thomas More, vol
9, 177-212 (Yale, 1979 [1532]), quoted in Harrington, 53 Hastings L J at 1266 (cited in
note 61).
7 Philip Nichols, Nichols on Eminent Domain, J.L. Sackman, ed 1.22[l] (Matthew
Bender, 1997).
72 Harrington, 53 Hastings L J at 1269 (cited in note 61).
7-1 Stat 6 Hen 6, c. 5 (1427), described in Stoebuck, 47 Wash L Rev at 565 (cited in
note 7).
74 See Stoebuck, 47 Wash L Rev at 578 (cited in note 7). Even into the sixteenth cen-
tury, however, Parliament sometimes expressly declined to pay compensation, for ex-
ample, when it authorized road builders to take gravel or soil from private lands to re-
pair the king's highways. See 9 Hen 5, c St 2, c. 11 (1421); 5 Eliz c 13 (1562-63). See also
Harrington, 53 Hastings L J at 1262 n. 2 (cited in note 61). Parliament also declined to
compensate the Church, in the 16th century when it authorized King Henry VIII to ex-
propriate the land holdings of more than 800 monastic and clerical establishments.
This massive expropriation did not lead to public outcry because the King left the lands'
tenants in possession. By taking title, Parliament merely transferred "tax" revenues
from the Church to the King. See Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom: The Story of
How Through the Centuries Private Ownership Has Promoted Liberty and the Rule
of Law 134 (1999). Also see Goldsworthy, Sovereigntyof Parliament at 58 (cited in note
20) (noting that "the Reformation Parliament frequently overrode title to property).
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whose mill, bridge, or dam had to be removed as part of the river im-
provement project.7"
Even statutes in which Parliament expressly denied compensation
for takings tacitly acknowledged the emergence of a compensation
convention. A 1512 statute, for example, authorized the taking of
land along the Cornish coast for fortifications with an express denial
of compensation.7 6 In discussing this statute, William Stoebuck ap-
preciates that Parliament had good reason to deny compensation be-
cause "the act was in aid of the king's prerogative to build fortifica-
tions;" but he also finds significant the fact that Parliament deemed
it "necessary to explicitly deny compensation, hinting that someone
in 1512 might otherwise have expected it.' 77
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the convention of pay-
ing compensation for expropriated land was so well established that
"[n]o statute of that era has been found denying compensation for
a taking.' 78 Even during the great enclosure movement from the fif-
teenth century to the middle of the nineteenth century, when Parlia-
ment transferred millions of acres of common lands into private own-
ership, it always offered compensation to those who were dispossessed
of vested rights in the common lands.79 In his Commentaries on the
Laws of England (1765-1769), William Blackstone wrote:
the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently does, interpose
and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it inter-
pose and compel? Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his
7' Stat 6 Hen 8, c 17 (1514-1515), described in Stoebuck, 47 Wash L Rev at 566 (cited
in note 7).
76 Stat 4 Hen 8, c 1 (1512).
77 Stoebuck, 47 Wash L Rev at 566 (cited in note 7) (emphasis added).
78 Id at 579.
79 See, for example, Frank A. Sharman, An Introduction to the Enclosure Acts, 10 J
Legal Hist 45, 47-48 (1989); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L J 1315,
1392 (1993). The level of compensation was highly variable. G.E. Mingay, Parliamen-
tary Enclosure in England: An Introduction to its Causes, Incidence and Impact 1750-
1850 126-32 (Longman, 1998). Enclosure acts typically did not offer compensation to
tenants and laborers who relied on the commons for their livelihood, but did not pos-
sess vested rights in the common lands. As G.E. Mingay has written, "a strict line was
drawn between those who could legitimately prove a common right and those who
could not. Id at 129. See also WA. Armstrong, Labour I: Rural Population Growth, Sys-
tems of Employment, and Incomes, in G.E. Mingay, Joan Thirsk, eds, The Agrarian His-
tory of England and Wales 1750-1850, vol 9 at 641, 721-28 (Cambridge, 1989). Hence,
E.P. Thompson's reference to the enclosure movement as "a plain enough case of class
robbery" E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class 218 (Vintage,
1963). See also E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (Pen-
guin, 1975). Not all enclosures were accomplished through Parliamentary Acts; much
common land was enclosed pursuant to private agreements among the various owners
of vested rights in the commons.
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property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indem-
nification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained....
All the legislature does is to oblige the owner to alienate his pos-
sessions for a reasonable price; and even this is an exertion of
power, which the legislature indulges with caution, and which
nothing but the legislature can perform.80
Blackstone understated Parliament's eminent domain power as a mere
authority to force sales. In fact, Parliament could, in Blackstone's
time and still today, choose to take property rights without paying
any compensation. More importantly, however, the quote from Black-
stone suggests just how rare uncompensated takings were in practice.
Even when Parliament abolished slavery in all its colonies in 1833,
the emancipation statute provided compensation for slave owners."1
Eventually, the convention whereby Parliament would pay compen-
sation for outright takings of land and other private property evolved
into a common law presumption favoring (but not requiring) com-
pensation. That common law presumption persists to this day. In
the 1960 case of Belfast Corporation v. O.D. Cars Ltd.,8 2 Viscount
Simonds wrote: "[i]t is, no doubt, the law that the intention to take
away property without compensation is not to be imputed to the leg-
islature unless it is expressed in unequivocal terms. '8 3 The evolution
of the compensation convention into a common law presumption
did not, however, prefigure any judicial assertion of authority over
Parliamentary takings. Viscount Simonds went on to write in Belfast
Corporation that "[miatters of policy which are determined by the
Government and carried out in detail by the aid of an experienced ad-
ministrative staff cannot be confided to the judiciary.8 4 The judiciary
will not impute Parliamentary intent to deny compensation, unless
such intent is plainly manifest in the statute, but neither will the
courts deny or overrule Parliament's expressed intent."
80 Blackstone, Commentaries at 135 (cited in note 59).
81 Maitland, Constitutional History at 339 (cited in note 56)
82 Belfast Co v 0 D Cars Ltd, 119601 NI 60 (1959).
83 See Attorney-General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd, [1920] A.C. 508 (H.L.) at
542. ("unless the words of the statute clearly so demand, a statute is not to be con-
strued so as to take away the property of a subject without compensation.").
84 [1960] NI 60 (14 Dec. 1959).
85 For example, in 1965 Parliament enacted the War Damages Act to reverse a court
decision (Burmah Oil v Lord Advocate 119651 AC 75) awarding damages for the British
Army's destruction of Burmese rubber plantations during World War i to prevent those
plantations from falling into the hands of the Japanese. Judges complained that Par-
liament's act denying compensation was unconstitutional and violated judicial inde-
pendence, but they were powerless to overturn Parliament's express will. See Stevens,
note 66, at 96.
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2. No Compensation for "Regulatory Takings" in the UK
Prior to the twentieth century at least, few feared that Parliament
would take property or "go too far" in regulating it without com-
pensation mainly because "property interests were well-represented
within its ranks. ' s6 During the twentieth century, however, the repre-
sentation and power of property interests in Parliament declined, par-
ticularly with the waning of the House of Lords. As Beverley J. Poo-
ley has written, that "body which lives under the constant threat of
extinction cannot exert great political pressure. s7 There is no evidence,
however, that uncompensated expropriations of title increased dur-
ing the twentieth century. The traditional convention concerning
compensation for expropriations remains in full effect. On the other
hand, the extent of uncompensated government regulation of private
property has increased dramatically since the middle of the nine-
teenth century.
In contrast to the experience of the United States, increased prop-
erty regulation in the United Kingdom has not led to the introduction
of new constitutional and legal institutions, such as regulatory tak-
ings.18 Instead, the UK continues to rely on its historical conventions,
including the convention that no compensation is required or pre-
sumed when the government merely regulates (without taking title
to) private property.
Lord Radcliffe explained this convention in the case of Belfast Cor-
poration v. O.D. Cars Ltd. :89
Side by side with this [presumption that compensation will be
paid for outright takings of private property], and developing
with increasing range and authority during the second half of the
nineteenth century came the great movement for the regulation
of life in cities and towns in the interests of public health and
amenity. It is not an adequate description of the powers involved,
86 Maitland, Constitutional History at 494 (cited in note 56), notes that as late as
the eighteenth century, members of the House of Commons had to be landowners. See
also Harrington, 53 Hastings L J at 1265 (cited in note 61).
87 Pooley Evolution at 29 n. 47 (cited in note 55).
88 But see Belfast Corporation v 0 D Cars Ltd, [19601 NI 60 (1959) (Viscount Si-
monds: "The day may come when it will be necessary to consider the relevance to the
constitution of Northern Ireland of the observation of Holmes J in (Pennsylvania Coal]:
'The general rule at least is, that, while 'property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too 'far it will be recognized as a taking.' If the question is one of de-
gree, I am clearly of the opinion that the day did not arrive with section 10(2) of the Act
of 1931."). If that day ever does arrive, it would fundamentally alter Britain's entire
legal system.
89119601 NI 60 (14 Dec. 1959).
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so far at any rate as the United Kingdom is concerned, to speak
of them as "police powers." They went far beyond that....
Achieved by one means or the other, there is no doubt at all that
the effect of them was to impose obligations and restrictions
upon the owner of town land which impaired his right of devel-
opment, prohibited or restricted his rights of user and, in some
cases, imposed monetary changes upon him or compelled him
to expend money on altering his property. Generally speaking,
though not without exception, these obligations and restric-
tions were treated as not requiring compensation, though, of
course, in a sense they expropriated certain rights of property.
A perusal of the Public Health Act, 1875, will be sufficient to
make the point. It shows how extensive interference could be,
even at that date. Only in a few special cases is compensation
provided for the consequence of interference. No one, so far as I
know, spoke of this as a "taking of property" or treated the gen-
eral principle of "no taking without compensation" as appli-
cable to the case .... What is important, I think, is to recognize
that though interference with rights of development and user
had come to be a recognized element of the regulation and plan-
ning of towns in the interest of public health and amenity, the
consequent control, impairment or diminution of those rights
was not treated as a "taking" of property nor, when compensa-
tion was provided, was it provided on the basis that property or
property rights had been "taken," but on the basis that property,
itself retained, had been injuriously affected.
As Parliament can take title to private property without paying com-
pensation, so it can regulate private property without paying compen-
sation. The difference is that, when Parliament takes title, it is pre-
sumed to intend to pay compensation, unless the statute expressly
denies compensation. Mere regulation of property in the UK carries
no such presumption. To the contrary, there appears to be a presump-
tion that parliamentary regulations of private property are not com-
pensable unless Parliament expressly awards compensation. And as
Lord Radcliffe points out in Belfast Corporation, since the middle of
the nineteenth century, Parliament increasingly has regulated private
property without compensation.
During the twentieth century, the UK's Parliament, no less than the
US's Congress, regulated private property to protect public health and
safety, as well as the natural environment. By far, the most significant
regulatory impositions on private property in the UK resulted from
"town and country planning." First instituted in 1909, the British
planning system is even more extensive and intrusive than compre-
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hensive zoning in the US. The UK's 1947 Town and Country Planning
Act nationalized all land development rights,90 so that the govern-
ment could completely control the future development of the coun-
try. The Act prohibited development of privately owned lands except
as permitted by local government planning agencies, providing only
limited compensation for landowners whose development rights were
taken or significantly reduced.9' As Malcolm Grant has explained:
The Act imposed first a general prohibition against any develop-
ment without permission.... Next the Act adopted the general
principle that no compensation should have to be paid if plan-
ning permission were refused, except in certain limited cases. In-
stead, landowners were left with a claim against a global sum of
£300 million in respect of any loss of development value caused
by the Act. It was a limited scheme, and its purpose was more to
inject confidence into the market by meeting hardship cases
than to provide an objectively measured level of compensation
for loss of development rights. Admitted claims for loss were
met at the rate of 16 shillings in the pound (80 pence) prior to the
winding up of the fund in 1953, and the government had secured
its objective: the nationalization of development rights in land.92
Professor Grant notes that Parliament provided very limited excep-
tions to the no-compensation rule, for instance in cases where denial
of planning permission dashed reasonable and legitimate develop-
ment expectations (e.g., to increase the size of an existing building by
10 percent).93 In addition, the 1947 Act allowed landowners to force
compulsory purchase by the government (akin to the American rule
of inverse condemnation), if the lack of development rights left their
land without any "reasonably beneficial use' 94 Landowners also might
receive compensation if planning authorities ordered an existing use
90 See JB. Cullingworth, Town and Country Planning in England and Wales 150 (Sta-
tionary Office, 1964). Some authors distinguish between nationalization of "rights"
and nationalization of "title." Nationalization of title gives rise to compensation pur-
suant to the traditional compensation convention, but nationalization of rights does
not. See Malcolm Grant, Compensation and Betterment, in B. Cullingworth, ed, British
Planning: 50 Years of Urban and Regional Policy 62 (Athlone, 1999) ("there is in
Britain no compensation for the loss of development rights, only for the physical tak-
ing of land (i.e. for the acquisition of title)").
91 Grant, Urban Planning Law at 23 (cited in note 60).
92 Id at 63.
93 Parliament repealed this exception in the 1991 Town and Country Act. See id at
63, n.3.
94 Id. Note the similarity to the US Supreme Court's decision in Lucas, 505 US 1003
(1992), holding that government must compensate when a police power (non-nuisance)
regulation deprives the landowner of any beneficial uses for the land.
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of land discontinued or reneged on a previously granted planning per-
mission.95 Even where Parliament provided for compensation, however,
the amount of compensation was based only on existing uses, never on
potential use following development. 96
Generally speaking, the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act took
away landowners' substantive legal rights to develop land and replaced
them with a small set of "procedural rights: principally the right to
have a planning application determined in accordance with the de-
velopment plan and other material considerations, and the right to
appeal to the Secretary of State against a local authority's refusal of per-
mission or conditions imposed by them."9 7 These procedural rights
created a limited role for the courts in town and country planning to
ensure that local governments did not exceed the authority Parlia-
ment gave them under the Act.
In the landmark case of Pyx Granite v. Minister of Housing and Lo-
cal Government,"s the court ruled that even though the 1947 Act
expressly authorized local authorities to impose "such conditions as
they think fit," any conditions must: (1) reasonably and fairly relate
to the development being permitted; (2) have a planning purpose; and
(3) not be manifestly unreasonable. Still, the courts have no author-
ity, independent of the statute, to require compensation for a denial
of planning permission. As Malcolm Grant has written, "the tradi-
tion of judicial non-intervention has remained, and the courts have
remained largely unmoved by pleas for greater openness and more
visible fair play in decision making. Change has had to come instead
through political and legislative action. ' 99
The judiciary's role could increase in future years, however, thanks
to the Human Rights Act, which Parliament enacted in 1998 to meet
the UK's obligations under the 1950 European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Article 1 of
95 In the UK, the development right vests immediately upon the granting of per-
mission; therefore, compensation is due if permission is subsequently revoked. Grant,
Urban Planning Law at 454-455 (cited in note 60).
96 There is, however, an exception, allowing payment of an ex gratia supplement,
when necessary to avoid undue hardship. See Cullingworth, Town and Country at 157
(cited in note 90). Such exgratia supplements do not constitute compensation because
they are not received as of right.
97 Id.
9' Pyx Granite v Minister of Housing and Local Government, [1958] 1 QB 554, re-
versed on other grounds 11960] A.C. 260. For a more recent case, restating the Pyx
Granite court's interpretation of the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, See New-
bury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment, [19811 A C 578, [19801
1 All ER 731.
99 Grant, Urban Planning Law at 560 (cited in note 60).
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the First Protocol to the UK's Human Rights Act concerns The Pro-
tection of Property:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoy-
ment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his posses-
sions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions
provided for by law and by the general principles of interna-
tional law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair
the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to
control the use of property in accordance with the general in-
terest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions
or penalties. 100
The effect of this provision on relations between Parliament and
the courts remains uncertain. '° The text refers to rights of "peaceful
enjoyment" of property and protection against government depriva-
tion, but expressly authorizes government impairment of property
rights "in the public interest," in accordance with "general principles
of international law," and "in the general interest." Nothing in the
text plainly subjects parliamentary legislation to judicial review.
Other sections of the Act make clear, however, that in case of a con-
flict between an act of Parliament and the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Parlia-
ment's will prevails. 0 2 Thus, parliamentary sovereignty remains in-
100 See http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/actsl998/80042-e.htm#schlptI.
10' "The deep constitutional significance of the [Human Rights Act] on fundamen-
tal principles of legality and the rule of law will only be felt over time. As for Parlia-
mentary sovereignty, formally this remains intact. Nonetheless, the strong likelihood
is that the [Human Rights Act] is effectively entrenched for practical constitutional
purposes." Dominic McGoldrick, The United Kingdom's Human Rights Act 1998 in
Theory and Practice, 50 Int'l & Comp L Q 901 (2001).
11o2 See David Jenkins, From Unwritten to Written: Transformation in the British
Common-Law Constitution, 36 Vand J Transnat'l L 863,948 (2003) (discussing section
3(2) of the 1998 Human Rights Act); Jonathan L. Black-Branch, Parliamentary Su-
premacy or Political Expediency?: The Constitutional Position of the Human Rights
Act Under British Law, 23 Stat L Rev 59 (2002) ("the Human Rights Act is intended to
provide a new basis for judicial interpretation of all legislation, but 'not a basis for
striking down any part of it'."). In fact, the most the courts can do is declare legislation
(or some part of legislation) to be incompatible with the Human Rights Act. Then, it
is up to Parliament (or in some cases the government) to decide whether or not to
amend the offending legislation. According to Lord Woolf, former Chief Justice of En-
gland, every time the courts have declared some legislation to be incompatible with
the Human Rights Act-about 20 occasions so far-Parliament has amended the of-
fending legislation to bring it into conformity with the Human Rights Act. Conversa-
tion with Lord Woolf, Nov. 8, 2005.
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tact. 0 3 The Human Rights Act itself, as an act of Parliament, is sub-
ject to parliamentary repeal, amendment, or exception.' 4 On the
other hand, the Human Rights Act expressly authorizes and obligates
the courts to assess whether government land-use controls are, or are
not, in the "general interest.*1 0 5 Note that this provision, itself, con-
stitutes a politically instituted protection for private property rights.
Nevertheless, the courts have so far declined to use Article 1 of the
First Protocol to impose substantive limitations on government land-
use planners. 106
l03 See R v. Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebeline, 120001 2 AC 326,
[1999] 4 M1 ER 801, [1999] 3 WLR 972, [200011 Cr App Rep 275, [2000] Crim LR 486
(Lord Steyn: "it is crystal clear that the carefully and subtly drafted 1998 Act preserves
the principle of parliamentary sovereignty."). Also see Lord Falconer, A Department for
Constitutional Affairs Consultation Paper: Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court
for the United Kingdom (July 2003) ("In our democracy, Parliament is supreme ....
The constitution is made up of the whole body of the laws and settled practice and con-
vention, all of which can be amended or repealed by Parliament. Neither membership
in the European Union nor devolution nor the Human Rights Act has changed the fun-
damental position. Such amendment or repeal would certainly be very difficult in
practice and Parliament and the executive regard themselves as bound by the obliga-
tions they have taken on through legislation, but the principle remains intact."). Lord
Falconer's Consultation Paper is available on the World Wide Web at http://www.dca
.gov.uk/consult/supremecourt/#part4. But see Stevens at 97, 137-38 (cited at note 65)
(claiming that parliamentary supremacy has largely given way to executive supremacy
since the 1970s and, as a consequence, the role of independent judicial review has be-
come more important).
104 See McGoldrick, 50 Int'l & Comp L Q 901 (cited in note 101). Indeed, the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, which Parliament enacted in 2001, arguably abro-
gated the Human Rights Act by permitting suspected terrorists to be detained without
trial. That Act is available on the World Wide Web at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/
acts2001/20010024.htm.
105 See, for example, R. (on the application of Brennon) v Bromsgrove District
Council, [2003] EWHC 752 (Admin), [2003] P&CR 430, CO/3422/2002, (Transcript:
Smith Bernal) (upholding a tree preservation order under the 1990 Town and Country
Planning Act against a challenge under the 1998 Human Rights Act, based on the
court's finding that the legislation properly balanced the property rights of individuals
and the "general interest of the community"). Also see Michael Purdue, The Chang-
ing Role of the Courts in Planning, in B. Cullingworth, ed, British Planning: 50 Years
of Urban and Regional Policy 166 (Athlone, 1999).
106 Another section of the Human Rights Act-Schedule 1, Part 1, Article 6, on the
Right to a Fair Trial-has led the courts to impose additional, procedural obligations
on government land-use planners (but not on Parliament itself). See R (on the applica-
tion of Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Trans-
port and the Regions and other cases, [2001] UKHL 23, [2001] 2 All ER 929. See also
Bryan v United Kingdom, [1996], 28 EG 137, [199612 EGLR 123 (a decision preceding
the 1998 Human Rights Act, in which the European Court of Human Rights required
UK courts to afford greater judicial review of land planning decisions to ensure a fair
trial, as required under Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights). But See
R v Lambert, [2001] UKHL 37, 1200212 AC 545, paragraphs 79-81 (noting that although
courts have new interpretive obligations under the Human Rights Act, they do not
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V. COMPARING US AND UK INSTITUTIONS
FOR TAKINGS AND COMPENSATION
The UK's 1947 Town and Country Planning Act (as amended) may ap-
pear radical to American eyes, but it is useful to bear in mind its so-
cial and historical contexts. The United Kingdom is a relatively small
and crowded country with a long history of public interest in private
land uses. As Neil Alison Roberts has written:
Land has a different character where you have 56 million people
in an area less than the size of Wisconsin and where the 'fron-
tier', if it existed at all, was closed in the time of William the
Conqueror. In a nation where feudalism originally presupposed
a 'public' character to private use of land there has always been
a realisation that the allocation of this particular unique re-
source has far-ranging effects. In one sense the whole history of
the common law of property in England, whether it be that
horrible morass known as future interests, or the comparably
more recent innovations in covenants running with the land
and actions for nuisance, can be seen as a legal recognition of the
social character of this particular resource. This development
has accented the need for special legal apparatus to deal with
both land's use vis-a-vis the interests of neighbours and its use
over time. 10
7
From an historical perspective, the 1947 Act, with its rule of no
compensation, was a "product of its time." World War II had just
ended, and much of London and other urban areas of England were in
rubble. "The postwar government acted with the knowledge that the
electors would not easily understand or forgive a spate of speculating
and profiteering in land."108
Such considerations might have justified the Town and Country
Planning Act 60 years ago, but the Act (as amended) continues very
much in force today, as "the foundation stone of the British planning
system."' 0 9 In 2005, no land development occurs in England without
planning permission; there is no rightful expectation of planning per-
have the authority to "amend" statutes; in any case involving a statute that is incom-
patible with the terms of the Human Rights Act or the European Convention, the courts
must accede to Parliament's expressed will). See also Jenkins, 36 Vand J Transnat'l L at
948 (cited in note 102).
101 Neil Alison Roberts, The Reform of Planning Law: A Study of the Legal, Politi-
cal and Administrative Reform of the British Land-use Planning System 5 (Macmil-
lan, 1976).
108 Grant, Urban Planning Law at 64 (cited in note 60).
109 Id.
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mission; and, generally speaking, compensation need not be paid if
planning permission is denied.
Putting aside historical, cultural, and ideological differences be-
tween the US and the UK, how radical, really, is the UK's planning
system? As a practical matter, how much less protection, if any, does
it offer private landowners than America's constitutionally-based ju-
dicial doctrine of regulatory takings?
In 1982, Beverley J. Pooley wrote that the difference between in-
stitutional structures for protecting property rights in the UK and US
was insignificant:
[I]t may be thought, as indeed it is often stated, that Parliament
is supreme. However, this is true in theory only. In practice, there
are many conventions which the government must observe, and
a violation of these conditions would result at best in political
annihilation of the offending government at the next election
and at worst in revolution. It is submitted that in practice, so far
as the sanction behind governmental restraint is concerned, the
same forces are operative in any situation, whether the govern-
ment is working under a written constitution or not. A govern-
ment can only do those things which the people will allow it to
do, and whether the restraints are judicial in their nature, as in
the United States, or political, as in Britain, is, in the final anal-
ysis, a matter of small moment."0
Judicially enforced doctrines of regulatory takings may provide
marginally greater protection to private property rights than the UK's
political system of compensation conventions, town and country
planning, and compulsory purchase acts.' 11 But Professor Pooley im-
plicitly raises the important question of whether the marginal differ-
ence between property rights protection in the US and the UK is sig-
nificant enough to warrant the institution of judicial review, along
with its attendant social costs. In other words, is the game worth the
candle? I cannot pretend to offer a complete answer to that question.
The requisite empirical information about comparative rates and
costs of expropriations, comparative rates and costs of regulations,
comparative rates and costs of compensation awards, and compara-
tive administrative costs simply does not exist.
For starters, though, we might consider whether many (or any) cases
of regulatory takings in the US would have been resolved differently
1o Pooley, Evolution at 31 (cited in note 55).
"I See David Callies, An American Perspective on UK Planning, in B. Culling-
worth, British Planning: 50 Years of Urban and Regional Policy 264 (Atlone, 1999).
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under the UK's politically based system of property rights protection.
Consider, for example, the Nollan' 12 and Dolan cases,113 in which the
US Supreme Court established a substantive due process-like rule for
government-imposed conditions on land-use permits. When the gov-
ernment imposes conditions on the grant of a building or other land-
use permit: there must be an "essential nexus" between those condi-
tions and a legitimate governmental purpose; the conditions must
substantially further that legitimate governmental purpose, and the
burden imposed on the permittee must be roughly proportional to the
public harm stemming from that permittee's development activity.
It is entirely possible that Nollan and Dolan would have come out
just the same under the UK's 1947 Town and Country Planning Act,
as interpreted by the court in Pyx Granite.1 14 With respect to the
Dolan case in particular, Malcolm Grant has concluded that (a) British
planners could not legally have imposed on Mrs. Dolan the condi-
tions that the City of Tigard in fact imposed on her development; and
(b) local planners' conditions would have been subject to review
within the administrative system, including the possibility of a full
public hearing with expert witnesses and legal representation." 
5
What about the Lucas case, in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that the State of South Carolina had to pay compensation when its
regulation denied the plaintiff the right to develop his land? 1 6 Had
Lucas arisen in England, under the 1947 Town and Country Planning
Act, the plaintiff almost certainly would have been entitled to force
compulsory purchase by the government (for a price reflecting exist-
ing use value) because denial of planning permission would have
left his land without a "reasonably beneficial use.""' The Town and
County Planning Act also allows for consideration of landowners'
reasonable and legitimate "development expectations,""18 which is
analogous to the "reasonable, investment-backed expectations" test
the U.S. Supreme Court established in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York."19
More generally, in neither the US nor the UK are landowners enti-
tled to compensation for the effects of the vast majority of regulatory
112 Nollan v California Coastal Commission, 483 US 825 (1987).
13 Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374 (1994).
"4 See note 98 and accompanying text.
"I Malcolm Grant, If Tigard Were an English City: Exactions Law in England Fol-
lowing the Tesco Case, in D. Callies, ed, Takings: Land-Development Conditions and
Regulatory Takings after Dolan and Lucas 332, 350 (ABA, 1996)
116 See notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
"7 See note 94 and accompanying text.
"' See note 93 and accompanying text.
"9 Penn Central Transportation Co v City of New York 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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impositions; 2 0 and in both countries, as a practical matter, landown-
ers always are compensated when the government actually takes
title, although the UK uses a lower measure of compensation (exist-
ing use value) than the US ("fair market" value).12 '
This is not to argue that the UK system of positive planning is ei-
ther very good or better than the various American land-use planning
systems as a matter of policy. 22 It is likely that the UK system en-
tails greater social costs.2 3 Housing shortages, for example, are a reg-
ular feature of British life because of the time and expense required to
obtain planning permission and the scarcity of land available for de-
velopment. 24 Such shortages are relatively rare and localized phe-
nomena in the US (especially since the demise of rent control in large
cities). However, the larger point remains: private property rights are
substantially protected in the UK by the political process, with the
judicial role limited to enforcement of Parliament's statutes. Private
property rights might be marginally better protected in the US, but
the value of that marginal difference remains contestable (especially
given the dearth of empirical data). The difference in outcomes under
the UK and US systems could well be minor across the run of cases.
This conclusion is broadly consistent with the way the world seems
120 In other words, in both the UK and the US, the social costs of private land devel-
opment are "borne by private land developers rather than public agencies!' David L. Cal-
lies and Malcolm Grant, Paying for Growth and Planning Gain: An Anglo-American
Comparison of Development Conditions, Impact Fees, and Development Agreements,
23 Urb Law 221, 221 (1991).
121 In Epstein, Takings at 184 (cited in note 7), the author supports his claim that gov-
ernments should have to pay more than fair market value to compensate for takings by
asserting that, in the UK, parliament at one time required the government to pay a 10
percent bonus for compulsory purchases. This is true, but misleading, as the bonus was
added to use value compensation rather than fair market value compensation.
122 In the US, land-use planning is a state and local government regime, and plan-
ning regimes vary substantially from state to state. See Callies, An American Per-
spective (cited in note 111).
123 See Paul Cheshire and Stephen Sheppard, The Welfare Economics of Land Use
Regulation, 52 J Urban Econ 242 (2002) (finding that the UK's Town and Country Plan-
ning System imposes substantial net social costs).
124 According to the 2004 "Barker Review," between 1995 and 2001, while housing
prices in the UK rose by nearly 8 percent, the rate of new housing construction de-
clined by more than 15 percent. Kate Barker, Review of Housing Supply: Delivering
Stability: Securing Our Future Housing Needs: Final Report-Recommendations 13,
Chart 1.1 (March 2004). In the late 1980s, 46 percent of the UK's population could af-
ford to buy a property; but by the 1990s that percentage had fallen to 37. The Barker
Review specifically asserts that land-use regulations have played a significant role in
housing shortages by reducing the amount of land available for development and in-
creasing the cost of land development. Id at 6. Also See Roberts, Reform of Planning
Law at 190 (cited in note 106) (noting the opposition to "green belts"-areas around
cities which are not to be developed-on grounds that those areas deprived people of
inexpensive land for housing).
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to view both the United States and the United Kingdom as veritable
models of property rights protection. Even "Conservative" observers,
like the Heritage Foundation, give both countries high marks for pro-
tecting private property. Each year, Heritage publishes an Index of
Economic Freedom, which ranks countries as a "tool for policymak-
ers and investors.' 125 The rankings are based on 50 variables grouped
into the following 10 categories: trade policy; fiscal burden of gov-
ernment; government intervention in the economy; monetary pol-
icy; capital flows and foreign investment; banking and finance; wages
and prices; property rights; regulation; and informal market activity.
Our present concern is only with the property rights category, on
which the United States and the United Kingdom both consistently
receive the highest ranking (1.0).126 In its most recent assessment of
property rights protections in the UK, Heritage has little to say:
Property rights in the United Kingdom are well-secured. The
Economist Intelligence Unit reports that "contractual agree-
ments are generally secure in the U.K. There is no discrimina-
tion against foreign companies in court. The judiciary is of high
quality when dealing with commercial cases.
The Heritage Foundation has more to say about, and is more critical
of, the treatment of property rights in the US:
The United States does very well in most measures of property
rights protection, including an independent judiciary, a sound
commercial code and other laws for the resolution of property
disputes between private parties, and the recognition of foreign
arbitration and court rulings. However, the concerns outlined in
the 2003 Index linger. Uncompensated government expropria-
tions of property remain highly unlikely, but local governments'
abuse of eminent domain power with the seizure of private land
(with some compensation) and its transfer to another party for a
non-public or quasi-public use has become more common-de-
spite some successful legal challenges to that practice. An even
more serious problem is that governments at all levels impose
numerous regulatory and land-use controls that diminish the
value and enjoyment of private property. Examples include ex-
tensive "growth controls"; unreasonable zoning hurdles; facil-
ity permitting regimes; and far-reaching environmental, wet-
lands, and habitat restrictions on the use and development of
real estate. Thus, the protections for private property are under-
" Heritage Foundation, 2004 Index of Economic Freedom 1 (2004), available on the
World Wide Web at: http://www.heritage.org/ research/features/index/index.html.
126 On the overall index, the UK ranks 7th, three places ahead of the US. See id at 9.
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mined by a vast bureaucracy that has the power to interfere sub-
stantially with many property rights. The level of protection for
property in the United States may eventually turn on whether
the courts place clear limits on bureaucratic power or require
cost-effective remedies for property owners whose rights have
been effected.... 127
Read together, these assessments may say more about the Heritage
Foundation and the quality of its Index, than they say about the rela-
tive protections afforded private property in the UK and the US (per-
haps Heritage researchers need to spend more time in the UK). How-
ever, other indices of property rights reach similar conclusions. 128 The
US and the UK are both perceived to have, relatively speaking, highly
effective institutional structures for protecting property rights.
VI. POLITICAL PROTECTION OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY IN THE US
In the US, property rights are protected by the courts, as we have seen,
but not only by the courts. The federal Congress and state legislatures
also protect property rights in very important, though often underap-
preciated, ways, as positive political-economic theory would predict.
According to a 1995 Congressional Research Service Report on
Property Rights, long before there was an established "property-rights
movement" in the US, Congress endeavored to avoid unsettling the
economic expectations of property owners when it enacted regula-
tory statutes:
In dozens of laws... Congress has barred the application of reg-
ulatory restrictions to "valid existing rights"-an effort to leave
the settled economic expectations of property owners undis-
turbed (and to avert takings liability). Illustrations of the grand-
fathering of valid existing rights include SMCRA [the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977], the Wilderness
Act [of 19641, and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act [of 19681.
Other times, Congress has instructed that property owners are
127 Id at 404-05.
128 See, for example, James Gwartney and Robert Lawson, Economic Freedom in the
World: 2004 Annual Report 15, 164-165(CATO, 2004) (ranking the UK fifth in the
world (9.0 out of 10 possible points)and the US sixteenth in the world (8.2 out of 10 pos-
sible points for "Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights"). Again, the point is
not to endorse the idea of "ranking" countries according to any particular index; but
the fact that the US and UK are equally ranked in terms of protecting property rights
does seem significant given the vastly different approaches the two countries take to
protecting such rights.
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entitled to "just compensation" or compensation based on some
other formula-in some cases where the Constitution likely
would demand compensation as well, in some cases not.
In formal condemnations too, Congress has long been codi-
fying its concerns about property owners. Beginning in the 1960s,
Congress took to routinely attaching preconditions and limits
on the authority of federal agencies to condemn land. The rea-
soning was plain enough. Though the Constitution demands
condemnees be paid for land itself, it does not defray attendant
costs, loss of business, and emotional disruption of having
one's land taken. For this reason, Congress on occasion has pro-
hibited agencies from condemning after a specified maximum
acreage has been taken, or until all reasonable efforts to acquire
land by negotiation have failed, or as long as the land continues
to be used as it was on the date a conservation area was created,
or until Congress has specifically approved the condemnation
in question.
Recognizing that incidental losses to the condemnee can be
high, yet are not constitutionally compensable, Congress in 1970
enacted the Uniform Relocation Act (URA). The Act instructs
that federal programs (or federally assisted state programs) be
planned to minimize adverse impacts on persons displaced by
acquisition of their property for such programs. Further, the Act
mandates compensation for displaced persons for various inci-
dental losses (moving expenses, reestablishing a displaced busi-
ness, etc.), recognizing the constitutional noncompensability of
such items.12 9
In recent years, Congress has considered, but rejected, takings bills
that would provide even more protection for private property rights
than the Supreme Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence currently
affords. 130 In 1995, the US House of Representatives passed H.R. 925,
the Private Property Protection Act, which would have compensated
landowners for federal regulatory actions under the Clean Water Act,
Endangered Species Act, and Food Security Act of 1985 that dimin-
ished property values by 20 percent or more.13' That same year, the
Senate Judiciary Committee reported out S. 605, the Omnibus Prop-
erty Rights Act of 1995, which would have required compensation for
federal regulations that diminished private property values by 33 per-
129 Robert Meltz, The Property Rights Issue, CRS Report for Congress 95-200, Jan-
uary 20, 1995, available on the World Wide Web at: http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/
crsreports/ economics/on- 11.cfm? &CFID= 15288066&CFTOKEN=5479515
130 See id.
131 HR 925, 104th Cong (1995).
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cent or more.132 However, that bill did not pass, and the 104th Con-
gress ultimately enacted no takings legislation. 133
It is worth wondering whether Congress might have enacted some
such statute had the Supreme Court never interpreted the takings
clause to apply to government regulations (in addition to outright
takings of title by the government) in the first place. Is this a case of
Supreme Court activism "crowding out" potentially more effective
and efficient federal legislative action to protect property rights? 134
Such counterfactual questions are impossible to answer with confi-
dence, but they are nonetheless worth considering.
Congress is not the only "political" branch of government that
protects property rights. In 1988, President Reagan signed Executive
Order No. 12,630,131 which required federal executive branch agen-
cies to assess whether their actions or proposed actions constitute
takings under standards promulgated by the Attorney General. Those
standards were supposed to reflect current Supreme Court jurispru-
dence under the Fifth Amendment's takings clause.136 According to a
1993 report by the US General Accounting Office, executive branch
agency implementation of, and compliance with, E.O. No. 12,630
has been lax.137 However, the assessment-based approach of President
Reagan's executive order influenced a great deal of subsequent tak-
ings legislation enacted in the states.
During the 1990s, virtually every state in the US considered "tak-
ings" legislation of one form or another. Most bills were rejected; but
21 state legislatures adopted one of two general types of takings stat-
132 S 605, 104th Cong (1995).
133 See Mark W Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings
Legislation, 24 Ecol L Q 187, 189 (1997).
134 The theory of "crowding out" originally comes from the public finance literature.
It refers to a situation in which government borrowing, under an expansionary fiscal
policy, crowds out more productive private finance by raising interest rates. The result
is reduced economic growth. The notion of "crowding out" has been applied to all man-
ner of issues, including, for example, the idea that formal legal rules can "crowd out"
potentially more efficient social norms. See, for example, Sim B. Sitkin and Nancy L.
Roth, Explaining the Limited Effectiveness of Legalistic "Remedies" for Trust/Dis-
trust, 4 Org Sci 367, 376 (1993) ("legalistic remedies can erode the interpersonal foun-
dations of a relationship they are intended to bolster because they replace reliance on
an individual's 'good will' with objective, formal requirements."). For an application of
"crowding out" theory to landmark statutes, see Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Law 59 (6 th ed. 2002).
13- Exec Order No 12,630, 53 Fed Reg 8859 (1988), reprinted in 5 USC 601.
136 See Cordes, 24 Ecol L Q at 190 n. 18 (cited in note 133).
131 US General Accounting Office, Regulatory Takings: Implementation of Execu-
tive Order on Government Actions Affecting Private Property Use, GAO-03-1015
(Sept. 2003).
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utes. 13 Many states adopted assessment statutes, which require the
Attorney General or a relevant state agency to review proposed regu-
lations for their impacts on property rights (i.e., takings impact as-
sessments). Only five states, by contrast, have adopted compensation
statutes, providing property owners with a cause of action against
state agencies for regulatory impositions that reduce the value of
their properties. 139 It is unclear to what extent, if at all, takings im-
pact assessments would actually protect private property rights. Con-
sequently, I will focus here only on the compensation statutes, which
at least offer the potential of greater protection. 140
As of 1998, four states-Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas-
provided statutory compensation for regulatory takings in cases where
the regulation reduces land value by a set amount or more. Missis-
sippi was the first state to adopt a regulatory takings compensation
law in 1994 (subsequently amended in 1995). The Mississippi Agri-
cultural and Forestry Act 4 1 authorizes owners of agricultural or for-
est lands to sue the state or one of its agencies (including local gov-
ernments) for regulatory impositions that reduce the value of their
lands by more than 40 percent. The government can avoid a regula-
tory takings claim by rescinding the offending regulation, but the gov-
ernment is liable to pay damages while the regulation is in effect. The
Act exempts from compensability state and local government ac-
tions intended to prevent "real and substantial threats to the public
health and safety." 142
In Louisiana, the 1995 Right to Farm and Forest Act'4 3 grants a
cause of action to owners of agricultural or forest lands to sue state or
local government agencies for regulatory impositions that reduce the
value of their property by 20 percent or more. The remedy is full
compensation for the reduced value, or the landowner could force the
government to purchase the property at fair market value. The gov-
ernment can avoid paying compensation, however, by rescinding
138 Larry Morandi, Evaluating the Effects of State Takings Legislation, 23 State
Legis Rep (Jan. 1998), available on the World Wide Web at: http://www.ncsl.org/programs/
esnr/lr232.htm
'39 At least 25 states have considered compensation bills. See Cordes, 24 Ecol L Q at
212 (cite at note 133). Some of those compensation bills would have required compen-
sation for any diminution in value at all. See id at 212 n. 152. The first four states to
actually adopt legislation requiring compensation for regulatory takings were Florida,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Their compensation statutes are discussed in the text.
140 The discussion below builds on the analyses of Morandi, Evaluating the Effects
(cited in note 138), and Cordes, 24 Ecol L Q at 212 (cited in note 133).
141 Miss Code Ann 49-33-1 et seq.
142 Miss Code Ann 49-33-7(I).
143 La Rev Stat Ann 3:3601 et seq.
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the action resulting in the regulatory taking. As in Mississippi, the
Louisiana takings statute exempts state and local regulations de-
signed to prevent imminent threats to public health and safety.
44
Texas's compensation statute, unlike the Mississippi and Louisiana
acts, applies not only to agricultural and forest lands but to all real
property The 1995 Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act
45
defines a "taking" to include any state government action that re-
duces the value of real property by 25 percent or more. If a court finds
such a diminution in value, the government has the choice of re-
scinding its action or paying full compensation. Similar to the Mis-
sissippi and Louisiana statutes, the Texas law exempts actions, taken
in good faith, to prevent "a grave and immediate threat to life or prop-
erty."146 In addition, state and local actions in compliance with federal
mandates and actions regulating common-law nuisances are ex-
empted, as are all municipal (city) regulations.
Florida enacted its takings statute-the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private
Property Rights Protection Act' 4 7-just a few months after Texas en-
acted its law. Like the Texas statute, but in contrast to the Louisiana
and Mississippi statutes, the Florida law covers all kinds of real prop-
erty. But unlike all three of those other states, the Florida statute sets
no percentage diminution in property value that landowners must re-
alize before claiming compensation for a regulatory taking. Instead,
the law applies whenever government action "inordinately burdens"
the use of private property1 48 It defines that phrase in terms familiar
to anyone who has studied the Supreme Court's regulatory takings
jurisprudence. A landowner is "inordinately burdened" if she is "per-
manently unable to attain the reasonable, investment-backed expec-
tations" for the property, or if she "bears permanently a dispropor-
tionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the public, which
in fairness should be borne by the public at large. '1 49 Although the
Florida legislature used the words of the Supreme Court in describing
its cause of action for regulatory takings, it expressed its intention
144 La Rev Stat Ann 3:36021 12)(h).
145 Tex Gov't Code Ann 2007.001 et seq.
146 Tex Gov't Code Ann 2007.003(b)(7).
14' Fla Stat Ann 70.001 et seq.
14 Fla. Stat Ann 70.001(2).
149 Fla. Stat Ann 70.001(3). Compare Penn Central Transportation Co v City of New
York, 438 US 104, 124 (1978) (noting the significance, in takings claims, of "the extent
to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions"); Armstrong v United States, 364 US 40, 49 (1960) (noting that the "Fifth
Amendment's guarantee... [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.").
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that its statute should apply more liberally than the Supreme Court's
takings rules.15 0 Finally, like the Texas statute, the Florida takings law
exempts state actions to regulate common-law nuisances.
Three aspects of these state takings laws are striking. First, they
purport to substantially "expand the scope of compensable takings"
by adopting thresholds for compensation that are far lower than the
US Supreme Court requires.15 ' Second, very few lawsuits have been
brought under any of these statutes,12 including four in Texas, 15 3 six in
Florida,'- 4 one in Louisiana, 55 and none in Mississippi. The Florida and
1s0 See Fla. Stat Ann 70.001(9) (providing that a cause of action might exist for "gov-
ernment actions that may not rise to the level of a taking under the State Constitution
or the United States Constitution!').
"I Cordes, 24 Ecol L Q at 220 (cited in note 133).
1-2 This does not necessarily mean there have been no claims leading to settle-
ments, but the amount of litigation has been extremely low.
M Bragg v Edwards Aquifer Authority, 71 SW3d 729 (Tex 2002) (holding that State
well-permitting rules fall with the exceptions to the Property Rights Act "for actions
taken under a political subdivisions statutory authority to prevent waste or protect
rights of owners of interest in groundwater!'); McMillan v Northwest Harris County
Mun Util Dist No 24, 988 SW2d 337 (Tex App 1999) (holding that municipal utility dis-
trict "stand by" fees did not constitute a taking, and fell outside the scope of the state's
Property Rights Act); TNR CC v Accord Agriculture, Inc, Not reported in SW2d, 1999
WL 699825 (holding that the Property Rights Act did not protect property owners
neighboring regulated swine farm) ("not designated for publication"); Medearis v Bra-
zoria County Drainage District No 4, Dist Ct Brazoria County, 149th Judicial Dist Tex
(1995)(No. 95-M-2313) (holding that regulation requiring minimization of water runoff
during development violated the Property Rights Act and constituted a compensable
taking; the case is still pending for determination of damages).
151 Royal World Metropolitan v City of Miami Beach, 863 So2d 320 (Fla. Dist Ct
App 2003) (reversing summary judgment against plaintiff and concluding that the Act
waives sovereign immunity for claims of compensation for "inordinate burdens" im-
posed by public ordinances on private property rights); Sosa v City of W Palm Beach,
762 So2d 981 (Fla Dist Ct App 2000) (plaintiff's claim dismissed for failure to comply
with statutory prerequisites to filing a claim under the Act); Osceola County v Best
Diversified, 830 So2d 139 (Fla Dist Ct 2002) (dismissing appeal, for lack of jurisdiction,
against trial court ruling finding state and county environmental regulations "inordi-
nately burdened" plaintiff's property, and constituted an inverse condemnation re-
quiring compensation); Hanna v Environmental Protection Comm'n, 735 So2d 544
(Fla Dist Ct 1999) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff property owner's inverse condem-
nation action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Scott v Polk County, 793
So2d 85 (Fla Dist Ct 2001) (quashing trial court order dismissing appellant's claim of
due process violations stemming from a zoning decision); Seminole County v Pinter
Enters, Inc, 184 F Supp 2d 1203 (M D Fla. 2000) (remanding case based on Bert J Har-
ris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act to state courts, which had been improp-
erly removed to federal court).
151 Matthew Trosclair et al, v Matrana's Produce, Inc, 717 So2d 1257 (La 1998) (re-
versing trial court decision exempting appellee company from regulatory controls un-
der the 1995 Right to Farm and Forest Act).
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Texas cases have not yet resulted in any actual compensation awards to
property owners. 5 6 It is not clear, however, whether (and to what ex-
tent) the existence of these takings statutes has induced state and lo-
cal governments to reduce regulatory impositions in order to avoid li-
ability for compensation; nor is it clear whether (and to what extent)
state and local governments are settling claims prior to litigation.
Clearer evidence comes from the State of Oregon, which has a long
history of intensive land-use planning and regulation.'," In a 2004
public referendum, Oregon voters approved the nations most radical
anti-regulatory statute, Measure 37, by a 60 to 40 margin. 15 8 Measure
37 applies to all land use regulations, including those predating the
Measure's enactment, that restrict the use of private real property in
any way that affects its fair market value. The government body re-
sponsible for an infringing regulation must either compensate the prop-
erty owner for the lost property value or exempt the property from
the regulation. The Measure provides exceptions for regulations of
common-law nuisances, public health and safety regulations, includ-
ing pollution control regulations, and state and local regulations
required to comply with federal laws. But it provides no exceptions
for traditional zoning regulations.
The effects of Measure 37 already are being felt. Almost immedi-
ately after the measure took effect on December 2, 2004, 220 claims
were filed for regulatory exemption or compensation. 5 9 Thousands
more are expected to follow. Assuming Measure 37 is implemented
and enforced as written,160 it will neutralize the State's system of land-
use regulation and quite literally alter the Oregon landscape. Cities
and counties, which cannot afford to pay compensation because of
budgetary constraints will be forced, instead, to exempt all properties
with legitimate claims.
Whether or not Measure 37 constitutes good public policy, it patently
demonstrates that (a) political, as well as constitutional, constraints
156 As noted, however, a few cases are still pending compensation awards. Moreover,
at least 30 cases proceeded to dispute resolution under the Florida statute. See Morandi,
Evaluating the Effects (cited in note 138).
's7 See, e.g., Jan G. Laitos, Daniel H. Cole, Mary Christina Wood, and Sandra B.
Zellmer, Natural Resources Law 751-58 (2006).
"I' Measure 37 is reprinted on the World Wide Web at: http://www.sos.state.or.us/
lections/nov22004/guide/meas/m37_text.html
159 Laura Oppenheimer, Measure 37 Exposes Nerves: The New Property Rights Law
Moves From Theory to Reality as Commissioners Weigh Claims in a Tense Yamhill
County Hearing, Oregonian (Feb 2, 2005).
160 On February 21, 2006, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld Measure 37 against
constitutional challenges. MacPherson v Department of Administrative Services,
Case No. S52857, available on the World Wide Web at http://www.publications.ojd.state
.or.us/S52875.htm.
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limit the public regulation of private property rights; and (b) the po-
litical limitations are potentially much stronger and farther reaching
than existing constitutional constraints.
It is worth noting, however, that Measure 37 and all the other state
takings statutes discussed in this section were enacted after the Su-
preme Court's 1992 decision in Lucas. An intriguing question arises:
Could Lucas have served as a source of information (institutional
learning) for state legislators and an impetus to legislation? If so, then
the "crowding out" hypothesis, mentioned earlier, becomes less plau-
sible.' 6 1 Cross-institutional (and organizational) dynamics could be a
significant (if somewhat confounding) factor in comparative institu-
tional analysis.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Law's Limits, Neil Komesar demonstrated that the institution of
judicial review is insufficient to protect property rights. 162 In Regula-
tory Takings, William Fischel argued that the institution of judicial
review is not strictly necessary for that purpose (at least not at state
and federal levels of representative government). 63 The evidence, lim-
ited though it is, and the analysis in this article generally support Fis-
chel's conclusion, and provide reason for property owners to be opti-
mistic in spite of Komesar's conclusion.
Even if judicial review is neither necessary nor sufficient for pro-
tecting property rights, it may still have marginal utility for protect-
ing private property. That, ultimately, is a question of policy and, as
such, amenable to cost-benefit analysis. Does the marginal social
cost of regulatory takings law outweigh the marginal social benefit?
What would be the respective cost and benefit of alternative consti-
tutional, legal, political, or market-based institutions, such as insur-
ance, 164 for protecting, to a greater or lesser extent, private property
161 See note 134 and accompanying text.
162 See notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
16 See notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
164 See, for example, Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should
"Just Compensation " Be Abolished, and Would "Takings Insurance" Work Instead?,
64 Ohio St L J 451 (2003) (arguing that system of private insurance against expropria-
tion and regulatory devaluation would be as effective and more efficient than the con-
stitutional compensation system). In fact, "expropriation" insurance already exists to
protect certain types of commercial investments in risky political environments. Such
insurance is provided not only by private insurers, but by the U.S. government, through
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. See http://www.opic.gov/Insurance/
Products/expropriation.htm. Just how well such insurance systems work, or would
work in the US domestically, is questionable. They might create perverse incentives
for governments to take properties that are insured against expropriation, instead of
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rights? Not all of the variables in this analysis would be objective.
Reasonable minds would differ over the appropriate variables to con-
sider and the valuations of non-market variables. The outcome of the
cost-benefit analysis would depend heavily on the selection and val-
uation of those variables. 6s
In the UK, the courts and Parliament seem to concur that, at pres-
ent, property rights are sufficiently well protected without constitu-
tional judicial review. At least, political malfunctions have not yet
been so severe as to lead the UK courts to adopt a regulatory takings
doctrine a la the US. Perhaps the marginal costs of institutional
change still exceed the perceived marginal benefits of constitutional
judicial review. In the US, meanwhile, the Supreme Court appears to
be retreating to some extent from the high-water mark of regulatory
takings law, represented by Lucas and other decisions.1 66 There is no
reason to believe, however, that the Court will repudiate entirely its
regulatory takings doctrine and return to a passive role of deference
to legislative determinations of compensable takings and noncom-
pensable regulations-the status quo prior to Pennsylvania Coal-
any time soon.
Is one institutional structure of property rights protection obvi-
ously and objectively "better" than the other?
It is tempting to conclude that the UK's political system of property
rights protection and the US's reliance on judicial protection of prop-
erty are both appropriate to the institutional structures of their re-
spective governments. The UK is a unitary state, in which local gov-
ernments possess virtually no independent regulatory authority; they
exercise only that authority Parliament expressly grants them, in-
cluding the authority to permit or deny land development activities.
On Fischel's analysis, that structure should reduce the likelihood of
systematic majoritarian bias against private property owners in gov-
ernment processes. Government in the US, by contrast, is based on a
potentially more suitable but uninsured lands, simply to avoid landowner resistance
to the exercise of eminent domain. I am grateful to Richard Posner for raising this in-
teresting point.
165 In a subsequent article, Peter Grossman and I plan to offer a more elaborate
model of the marginal social utility of constitutional judicial review.
166 Other cases reflecting the "high water mark" of regulatory takings law include
Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374 (1994); Phillips v Washington Legal Foundation,
524 US 156 (1998); Eastern Enterprises v Apfel, 524 US 498 (1998); and City of Mon-
terey v Del Monte Dunes, 526 US 687 (1999). The retreat, such as it is, is evident in re-
cent cases such as Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc v Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 535 US 302 (2002) and Palazzolo v Rhode Island, 533 US 606 (2001). For thor-
ough analyses of these cases, and the trends they reflect, see Laura Underkuffler,
Tahoe's Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of Property and Justice, 21 Const
Comment 727 (2004).
Daniel H. Cole 181
federal system, in which local governments possess substantial inde-
pendent regulatory authority, increasing the potential for majori-
tarian bias against private property owners. Arguably, that difference
alone warrants the increased reliance on judicial review of regulatory
decisionmaking in the US, if only with respect to local governments.
The problem with this line of argument is that it substantially
overstates the difference between local government authority in the
US and UK. Even if, in theory, local governments in the US have more
independent regulatory authority than their counterparts in the UK,
that distinction marks little practical difference because: (1) Parlia-
ment has, by law, delegated to local governments substantial author-
ity to decide what land development activities may take place; and (2)
local governments in the UK have substantial latitude to interpret
parliamentary delegations of authority, which gives them additional
de facto regulatory power. Consequently, local governments in the
UK wield a great deal of regulatory authority, even if that authority
derives ultimately from Parliament. When those local governments
act, there is no reason to believe that they are immune to the kind of
majoritarian bias that besets local land-use regulation in the US. In
sum, local governments in the US and UK are similarly situated with
respect to land-use regulation.
Meanwhile, the decisions of local governments in both countries
are, in fact, subject to substantial judicial oversight. Although courts
in the UK do not have constitutional authority to review Parliament's
statutes, they are empowered to review local government actions to
ensure that those actions conform to parliamentary directives.167 Con-
sequently, the differential treatment of land-use regulations in the
US and the UK cannot be explained by the relative powers of their re-
spective local governments. In both countries, local governments ex-
ercise substantial regulatory authority over the use of privately owned
lands, and their land-use decisions are subject to judicial review (stat-
utory in the UK; statutory plus constitutional in the US). A far bigger
difference is found in the treatment of national land-use regulations.
In the US, congressional enactments affecting property rights are
subject to constitutional judicial review; in the UK, parliamentary
enactments are not.
Interestingly, the UK's structure of land-use regulation and protec-
tion conforms pretty closely to William Fischel's normative model: 68
national legislation is subject to virtually no constitutional judicial
review, but local government decisions are subject to substantial stat-
167 See note 64 and accompanying text (noting that courts in the UK retain the au-
thority to interpret and enforce statutes).
168 See notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
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utory judicial review, to ensure conformity with parliamentary di-
rectives. Consequently, it provides a natural test of Fischel's model,
according to which the UK's institutional structure should protect
private property rights sufficiently. Does it provide sufficient protec-
tion in fact? As noted earlier, the answer to that question remains un-
der-determined by the available evidence. It is obvious, however, that
the absence of constitutional judicial review in the UK has not led to
the demise of private property as an institution in that country. On all
accounts, property rights in the UK are very well protected, even if
not quite so well as in the US.
At the very least, the available evidence (a) cautions scholars and
jurists to avoid casual presumptions about the social utility or value
of constitutional judicial review for protecting property rights, and (b)
suggests that the extreme variety of distrust of democratically en-
acted regulations reflected, for example, in the scholarly writings of
Richard Epstein and Justice Scalia's opinion in the Lucas case may be
unwarranted. At least in the UK, democratic institutions, especially
at higher levels of government, not only expropriate and regulate pri-
vate property rights but also substantially protect those rights, even
in the absence of constitutional judicial review. To the extent the UK's
experience suggests that judicial distrust of democratic regulation of
private property is unwarranted, it calls into question the legitimacy
of the American judicial doctrine of "regulatory takings," which is
based explicitly on such distrust.
Finally, it is worth wondering whether the analysis in this article
might be extended to rights other than those of property. After all, in
the UK the courts do not prevent Parliament from regulating speech
rights or voting rights any more than they prevent Parliament from
regulating private property rights. Yet, those other rights also seem to
be reasonably well protected in England, Scotland, and Wales by Par-
liament. There seems little reason to suppose, however, that the mar-
ginal utility of constitutional judicial review would necessarily be
the same for protecting different kinds or categories of rights. It might
or might not be the case, for example, that constitutional judicial re-
view is more important for protecting the right of free speech than
rights of property. Clearly, the US and UK constitutional and legal
systems provide a great deal of fertile ground for further comparative
institutional analyses.
